Difference between revisions of "Industrial Automation Control System"

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While control systems used in distribution and manufacturing industries are very similar in operation, they are different in some aspects. One of the primary differences is that [[Distributed Control System|DCS]] or [[Programmable Logic Controller||PLC]]-controlled sub-systems are usually located within a more confined factory or plant-centric area, when compared to geographically dispersed [[SCADA]] field sites. [[Distributed Control System|DCS]] and [[Programmable Logic Controller||PLC]] communications are usually performed using local area network (LAN) technologies that are typically more reliable and high speed compared to the long-distance communication systems used by [[SCADA]] systems. In fact, [[SCADA]] systems are specifically designed to handle long-distance communication challenges such as delays and data loss
 
While control systems used in distribution and manufacturing industries are very similar in operation, they are different in some aspects. One of the primary differences is that [[Distributed Control System|DCS]] or [[Programmable Logic Controller||PLC]]-controlled sub-systems are usually located within a more confined factory or plant-centric area, when compared to geographically dispersed [[SCADA]] field sites. [[Distributed Control System|DCS]] and [[Programmable Logic Controller||PLC]] communications are usually performed using local area network (LAN) technologies that are typically more reliable and high speed compared to the long-distance communication systems used by [[SCADA]] systems. In fact, [[SCADA]] systems are specifically designed to handle long-distance communication challenges such as delays and data loss
 
posed by the various communication media used. DCS and PLC systems usually employ greater degrees of closed loop control than [[SCADA]] systems because the control of industrial processes is typically more complicated than the supervisory control of distribution processes <ref name="NIST">[http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-82/SP800-82-final.pdfv K. Stouffer, J. Falco, K. Kent, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, NIST Special Publication 800-82, June 2011]</ref>.
 
posed by the various communication media used. DCS and PLC systems usually employ greater degrees of closed loop control than [[SCADA]] systems because the control of industrial processes is typically more complicated than the supervisory control of distribution processes <ref name="NIST">[http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-82/SP800-82-final.pdfv K. Stouffer, J. Falco, K. Kent, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, NIST Special Publication 800-82, June 2011]</ref>.
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==Definitions==
 
==Definitions==
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==== Global Conference on CyberSpace 2015 (GCCS2015) ====
 
==== Global Conference on CyberSpace 2015 (GCCS2015) ====
Cyber Security of Industrial Control Systems <ref>[https://www.gccs2015.com/sites/default/files/documents/Cyber%20Security%20of%20Industrial%20Control%20Systems%20GCCS2015.pdf "Luiijf and Te Paske (2015), Cyber Security of Industrial Control Systems"]</ref>: Crucial processes in most critical infrastructures, and in many other organisations, rely on the correct and undisturbed functioning of Industrial Automation Control Systems. A failure of ICS may both cause critical services to fail and may result in safety risk to people and or the environment. Therefore, their cyber security and resilience is of utmost importance to society as a whole, to utilities and other critical infrastructure operators, and to organisations which use IACS. This good practice document provides private and public sector executives with an Executive Summary outlining the ICS risk and challenges. The document provides governmental policy-makers, technical managers, ICS suppliers and others involved in the ICS domain with background and security awareness information about the cyber security challenges for ICS. Moreover, the document provides a perspective for action and pointers to seventy relevant resources.  
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Cyber Security of Industrial Control Systems <ref>[https://www.gccs2015.com/sites/default/files/documents/Cyber%20Security%20of%20Industrial%20Control%20Systems%20GCCS2015.pdf Luiijf and Te Paske (2015), Cyber Security of Industrial Control Systems]</ref>: Crucial processes in most critical infrastructures, and in many other organisations, rely on the correct and undisturbed functioning of Industrial Automation Control Systems. A failure of ICS may both cause critical services to fail and may result in safety risk to people and or the environment. Therefore, their cyber security and resilience is of utmost importance to society as a whole, to utilities and other critical infrastructure operators, and to organisations which use IACS. This good practice document provides private and public sector executives with an Executive Summary outlining the ICS risk and challenges. The document provides governmental policy-makers, technical managers, ICS suppliers and others involved in the ICS domain with background and security awareness information about the cyber security challenges for ICS. Moreover, the document provides a perspective for action and pointers to seventy relevant resources.  
 
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* [[Programmable Logic Controller]]
 
* [[Programmable Logic Controller]]
 
* [[SCADA]]
 
* [[SCADA]]
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==Notes==
 
==Notes==

Revision as of 18:15, 11 April 2015

Industrial control system (ICS) is a general term that encompasses several types of control systems, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and other \control system configurations such as skid-mounted Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) often found in the industrial sectors and critical infrastructures. ICSs are typically used in industries such as electrical, water and wastewater, oil and natural gas, chemical, transportation, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, and discrete manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods.) [1].

While control systems used in distribution and manufacturing industries are very similar in operation, they are different in some aspects. One of the primary differences is that DCS or |PLC-controlled sub-systems are usually located within a more confined factory or plant-centric area, when compared to geographically dispersed SCADA field sites. DCS and |PLC communications are usually performed using local area network (LAN) technologies that are typically more reliable and high speed compared to the long-distance communication systems used by SCADA systems. In fact, SCADA systems are specifically designed to handle long-distance communication challenges such as delays and data loss posed by the various communication media used. DCS and PLC systems usually employ greater degrees of closed loop control than SCADA systems because the control of industrial processes is typically more complicated than the supervisory control of distribution processes [1].

Definitions

Standard Definition

ISA-62443-1-1

Collection of personnel, hardware, and software that can affect or influence the safe, secure, and reliable operation of an industrial process[2].

ISA-62443-3-3

Collection of personnel, hardware, software and policies involved in the operation of the industrial process and that can affect or influence its safe, secure and reliable operation [2].


Cyber Security Good Practice for Industrial Automation Control Systems

Global Conference on CyberSpace 2015 (GCCS2015)

Cyber Security of Industrial Control Systems [3]: Crucial processes in most critical infrastructures, and in many other organisations, rely on the correct and undisturbed functioning of Industrial Automation Control Systems. A failure of ICS may both cause critical services to fail and may result in safety risk to people and or the environment. Therefore, their cyber security and resilience is of utmost importance to society as a whole, to utilities and other critical infrastructure operators, and to organisations which use IACS. This good practice document provides private and public sector executives with an Executive Summary outlining the ICS risk and challenges. The document provides governmental policy-makers, technical managers, ICS suppliers and others involved in the ICS domain with background and security awareness information about the cyber security challenges for ICS. Moreover, the document provides a perspective for action and pointers to seventy relevant resources.

See also


Notes

References

  • ERNCIP's Thematic Group on Case Studies for the Cyber-Security of Industrial Automation and Control Systems [1]